

All questions carry Single Mark and have single answer.

Q1. Kerckhoffs' principle states that

- A) Only the key should be kept secret, but the methods or algorithms used to encrypt and decrypt should be publically known.
- B) Keys as well as the scheme of encryption containing the cipher methods should be kept secret.
- C) ENC and DEC algorithms should be kept secret and it is not risky even if key falls into the enemy's hands

Q2. Adversary learns one or more pairs of plaintexts/cipher texts encrypted under the same key. The aim of the adversary is then to determine the plaintext that was encrypted to give known cipher text. This scheme is called

- A) Cipher Text Only attack
- B) Known Plain Text Attack
- C) Chosen Plain text attack
- D) Chosen Cypher text attack

Q3. 2nd and Third Frequent letters in a given English Literature are

- A) T and A
- B) E and A
- C) T and E
- D) I and A

Q4. You are given a message (m) and its OTP encryption (c). Can you compute the OTP key from m and c ?

- A) No, I cannot compute the key.
- B) Yes, the key is  $k = m \oplus c$
- C) I can only compute half the bits of the key.
- D) Yes, the key is  $k = m \oplus m$ .

Q5. Can a stream cipher have perfect secrecy?

- A) Yes, if the PRG is really "secure"
- B) No, there are no ciphers with perfect secrecy
- C) Yes, every cipher has perfect secrecy
- D) No, since the key is shorter than the message

Q6. Suppose  $G:K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  is such that for all k:  $XOR(G(k)) = 1$  Is G predictable.

- A) Yes, given the first bit I can predict the second
- B) No, G is unpredictable
- C) Yes, given the first (n-1) bits I can predict the n'th bit
- D) It depends

Q7. Let  $G:K \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$  be a PRG such that from the last n/2 bits of G(k) it is easy to compute the first n/2 bits. Is G predictable for some  $i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$  ?

- A) Yes
- B) No

Q8. Let  $F:K \times X \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$  be a secure PRF. Is the following G a secure PRF?

$$G(k, x) = 0^{128} \text{ if } x=0 \text{ and } F(k,x) \text{ otherwise}$$

- A) No, it is easy to distinguish G from a random function
- B) Yes, an attack on G would also break F
- C) It depends on F

Q9. What are the possible key sizes of AES?

- A) 128, 192, 256
- B) 128, 256, 512
- C) 64, 128, 256
- D) 128,192,246

Q10. Let  $I = (S,V)$  be a MAC. Suppose an attacker is able to find  $m_0 \neq m_1$  such that  $S(k, m_0) = S(k, m_1)$  for  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the keys k in K Can this MAC be secure?

- A) Yes, the attacker cannot generate a valid tag for  $m_0$  or  $m_1$
- B) No, this MAC can be broken using a chosen msg attack
- C) It depends on the details of the MAC